The Court of Appeal in Abuja has vacated its earlier order reserving judgment in the N100m defamation appeal filed by the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project against two Department of State Services officers.
The appellate court directed that the case files be returned to the President of the Court of Appeal for a decision on a new hearing date.
The presiding judge, Justice Danlami Senchi, gave the directive while proceedings were ongoing in two related appeals arising from a defamation suit instituted against SERAP and others.
The development followed proceedings in the second appeal filed by Kolawole Oluwadare against Sarah John and two others.
Counsel for the appellant, Oluwatosin Adesioye, had sought the court’s permission to amend the reliefs in a pending application concerning additional records of appeal and an extension of time to appeal against the ruling and judgment of the lower court.
However, Justice Senchi expressed reservations about the application, telling the appellant’s counsel that the court was “finding it difficult to grant the prayers” and advising him to refine the application.
Adesioye subsequently withdrew the application on the court’s advice, and the court struck it out. Counsel for the respondents did not object to the withdrawal.
The substantive appeal by SERAP challenges the May 5, 2026 judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, presided over by Justice Yusuf Halilu, which awarded N100m in damages against the organisation in favour of two DSS officers over publications concerning an alleged visit by DSS operatives to SERAP’s Abuja office in September 2024.
Arguing the appeal, SERAP’s counsel, Tayo Oyetibo, SAN, questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court and challenged the identification of one of the respondents.
He argued that the judgment was delivered in favour of Sarah John for a person identified as Sarah David, adding that the description of a woman as tall, large and dark-skinned was insufficient without a photograph to establish her identity.
Mr Oyetibo adopted the appellant’s brief and urged the appellate court to set aside the judgment.
He also challenged the trial court’s reliance on the descriptions contained in the publications to establish that the respondents were the persons referred to.
However, counsel for the first and second respondents, O. S. Kehinde, urged the court to dismiss the appeal in its entirety.
He argued that SERAP had the burden of proving that Sarah John and Sarah David were different persons but failed to establish the claim. He also contended that the issue had not been raised before the trial court.
On the question of identification, Kehinde argued that a person did not necessarily have to be expressly named in a publication for the publication to be actionable, provided people who knew the person could identify them from the description.
He said a prosecution witness had testified at the trial that the respondents were identified through the descriptions in the publications.
The third respondent’s counsel did not advance arguments in the appeal.
During the proceedings, the court also considered applications by Columbia University, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to Freedom of Peaceful assembly and Association, and the Southern Africa Litigation Centre seeking permission to participate in SERAP’s appeal as amici curiae, independent parties permitted to assist a court with submissions on issues before it.
Counsel representing the applicants argued that the appeal raised constitutional and fundamental rights questions of public interest with global implications.
However, Justice Senchi observed that the applicants were not parties to the case at the trial court and noted that granting leave to participate was discretionary.
The judge indicated that the court did not consider their participation necessary, prompting the applicants to withdraw their respective applications.
The applications were subsequently struck out without objection from counsel to SERAP or the respondents.
The court’s latest directive means that a fresh hearing date for both appeals will be determined by the President of the Court of Appeal and communicated to the parties.
